INTERNET EDITION
第１３４０号
１９９７年０２月２１日（金）
グリーンスパン証言関連
半年に一度のグリーンスパンFED議長のハンフリー・ホーキンス法に基づく議会証言は、前回話題になった同議長の講演（１２月０５日）より、遙かに株価の水準、および上昇ペースに強い警戒感を示す内容となりました。
１２月０５日の講演では、「
irrational exuberance 」（根拠なき陶酔）という今や有名になった言葉を使いながらも、それが８０年代後半の日本市場を指すのか、直接的に今のアメリカの株を指すのか曖昧だった。しかし、今回の議会証言では、
「 As you know,
last December I put the question this way: "...how do we
know
when irrational exuberance has unduly
escalated asset values, which
then become subject to unexpected
and prolonged contractions ...?」
と述べて、議長の懸念が直接に今のニューヨーク株式市場に向けられていることを示した。同議長は、今の低い長期金利に企業の極めて強い収益見通しが加われば今の株価は正当化されうるとしながらも、過去２年間の株価の上昇ペースは明らかに懸念材料であるとしている。議長は歴史をしばしば引き合いに出して、「今までの株価理論はもう古い。○○の新しい理論を援用すれば、今の株価や今後の株価は正当化される」「株価新時代が始まった」たぐいの論法は
「But, regrettably,
history is strewn with visions of such "new eras" that,
in the end, have proven to be a mirage. In short, history
counsels caution.」
と述べて、行き過ぎた強気論の危険性を指摘、仮にこの株価が下げに転じたときは、今のバランスの良い米経済の成長がとぎれてしまう危険性を指摘した。同議長は「株価新時代説」が正当性を持ちうる可能性として
- 市場の効率性を高めていること
- 世界的に市場規模が拡大し、競争条件もグローバルなものになっていること
- 情報技術の伝搬
などを指摘しながらも
「 Such
caution seems especially warranted with regard to the sharp
rise in equity prices during
the past two years.
These gains have
obviously raised questions of sustainability」
と、過去２年間の株価の上昇ペースに警告を発している。これは同議長が、今のアメリカ経済の順調な拡大ペースをもっとも脅かす危険性があるものとして「株価」を意識していることを示している。しかし、同議長は「だからただちに利上げする」とは言っていない。あくまでも、株価の上昇がアメリカ経済に「imbalances」を生む危険性を示し、その危険があるときには「行動を辞さない」と述べたわけである。
――――――――――
同議長のインフレに対する見方は、昨年末から変わっていない。
〈インフレについて〉
１．（景気好調の中でも）インフレ抑制に役立っていた要因
労働者の職維持に対する不安感
コンピューターなどの新技術の進展・普及
グローバル・コンペティション
国内の規制緩和
２．上記要因は「一時的」である危険性
労働者は自信を深めている
労働賃金も上昇気配
３．予防的（PREEMPTIVE)引き締めも
というもの。しかし、グリーンスパンは「インフレ抑制に役立っていた要因」を「一時的なものである可能性」を指摘しながらも、実はかなり持続的なものと考えているのではないかと思われる。全体的なトーンとしても、インフレに対する懸念は高まっているとは言えない。
――――――――――
マスコミは取り上げないかもしれないが、グリーンスパン議長も米経済にきわめて強気なことは注目される。彼のエンディングの言葉はおもしろい。
「 Although
a central banker's occupational
responsibility is to stay on the lookout
for trouble, even I must
admit that our economic prospects
in general are quite favorable.
The flexibility of our market
system and the vibrancy of our private
sector remain examples for the
whole world to emulate.
The Federal
Reserve will endeavor to do its part
by continuing to foster a
monetary framework under which our
citizens can prosper to the
fullest possible extent.」
斜線の部分などは、クリントンでも言わない。
マーケットの反応は一部は行き過ぎ、一部は妥当なものである。株はダウで一時１２０ドル程度下げ、結局５０ドル強の下げにとどまったが、これはグリーンスパン発言に対する素直な反応といえる。債券は、やや売られ過ぎである。「金融政策は効果がラグしがちだから、preemptiveな利上げをする可能性も」と言っているが、賃金や物価が持続的に上がり出す兆候は出ていない。債券は今後徐々に買い戻されるのでは。ドルは上昇したが、これはショートの買い戻したが主だと思われる。今後しばらくは、ニューヨークの株とドルが脆弱性を増す可能性がある。
《グリーンスパン証言のポイント》
１．米経済の現状と先行きには、upbeat
CPI
伸び率＝２．７５−３．０％
失業率＝５．２５−５．５％
実質GDP伸び率＝２．０−２．２５％
２．インフレには監視姿勢継続
３．株価は、「要警戒」
〈インフレについて〉
１．インフレ抑制に役立っていた要因
労働者の職維持に対する不安感
コンピューターなどの新技術の進展・普及
グローバル・コンペティション
国内の規制緩和
２．上記要因は「一時的」である危険性
労働者は自信を深めている
労働賃金も上昇気配
３．予防的（PREEMPTIVE)引き締めも
〈株価について〉
１．注意が必要
市場にみなぎるやや行き過ぎとも思える楽観論
上げのスピード（継続性に疑問）
２．“NEW
ERAS"
MIGHT BE A MIRAGE
３．利上げオプション残すが、当面は様子見のスタンス
グリーンスパン証言の全文
Monetary Policy Testimony and Report
to the Congress
Testimony of Alan Greenspan
Chairman, Federal Reserve Board
February 26, 1997
I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before this Committee to
present the Federal Reserve's semiannual
report on monetary policy.
The performance of the U.S. economy
over the past year has been
quite favorable. Real GDP growth picked
up to more than three
percent over the four quarters of
1996, as the economy progressed
through its sixth year of expansion.
Employers added more than
two-and-a-half million workers to
their payrolls in 1996, and the
unemployment rate fell further. Nominal
wages and salaries have
increased faster than prices, meaning
workers have gained ground in
real terms, reflecting the benefits
of rising productivity. Outside
the food and energy sectors, increases
in consumer prices actually
have continued to edge lower, with
core CPI inflation only 2-1/2
percent over the past twelve months.
Low inflation last year was both a
symptom and a cause of the good
economy. It was symptomatic of the
balance and solidity of the
expansion and the evident absence
of major strains on resources. At
the same time, continued low levels
of inflation and inflation
expectations have been a key support
for healthy economic
performance. They have helped to create
a financial and economic
environment conducive to strong capital
spending and longer-range
planning generally, and so to sustained
economic expansion.
Consequently, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) believes it
is crucial to keep inflation contained
in the near term and
ultimately to move toward price stability.
Looking ahead, the members of the
FOMC expect inflation to remain
low and the economy to grow appreciably
further. However, as I shall
be discussing, the unusually good
inflation performance of recent
years seems to owe in large part to
some temporary factors, of
uncertain longevity. Thus, the FOMC
continues to see the
distribution of inflation risks skewed
to the upside and must remain
especially alert to the possible emergence
of imbalances in
financial and product markets that
ultimately could endanger the
maintenance of the low-inflation environment.
Sustainable economic
expansion for 1997 and beyond depends
on it.
For some, the benign inflation outcome
of 1996 might be considered
surprising, as resource utilization
rates--particularly of
labor--were in the neighborhood of
those that historically have been
associated with building inflation
pressures. To be sure, an
acceleration in nominal labor compensation,
especially its wage
component, became evident over the
past year. But the rate of pay
increase still was markedly less than
historical relationships with
labor market conditions would have
predicted. Atypical restraint on
compensation increases has been evident
for a few years now and
appears to be mainly the consequence
of greater worker insecurity.
In 1991, at the bottom of the recession,
a survey of workers at
large firms by International Survey
Research Corporation indicated
that 25 percent feared being laid
off. In 1996, despite the sharply
lower unemployment rate and the tighter
labor market, the same
survey organization found that 46
percent were fearful of a job
layoff.
The reluctance of workers to leave
their jobs to seek other
employment as the labor market tightened
has provided further
evidence of such concern, as has the
tendency toward longer labor
union contracts. For many decades,
contracts rarely exceeded three
years. Today, one can point to five-
and six-year
contracts--contracts that are commonly
characterized by an emphasis
on job security and that involve only
modest wage increases. The low
level of work stoppages of recent
years also attests to concern
about job security.
Thus, the willingness of workers in
recent years to trade off
smaller increases in wages for greater
job security seems to be
reasonably well documented. The unanswered
question is why this
insecurity persisted even as the labor
market, by all objective
measures, tightened considerably.
One possibility may lie in the
rapid evolution of technologies in
use in the work place.
Technological change almost surely
has been an important impetus
behind corporate restructuring and
downsizing. Also, it contributes
to the concern of workers that their
job skills may become
inadequate. No longer can one expect
to obtain all of one's lifetime
job skills with a high-school or college
diploma. Indeed, continuing
education is perceived to be increasingly
necessary to retain a job.
The more pressing need to update job
skills is doubtless also a
factor in the marked expansion of
on- the-job training programs,
especially in technical areas, in
many of the nation's corporations.
Certainly, other factors have contributed
to the softness in
compensation growth in the past few
years. The sharp deceleration in
health care costs, of course, is cited
frequently. Another is the
heightened pressure on firms and their
workers in industries that
compete internationally. Domestic
deregulation has had similar
effects on the intensity of competitive
forces in some industries.
In any event, although I do not doubt
that all these factors are
relevant, I would be surprised if
they were nearly as important as
job insecurity.
If heightened job insecurity is the
most significant explanation of
the break with the past in recent
years, then it is important to
recognize that, as I indicated in
last February's Humphrey-Hawkins
testimony, suppressed wage cost growth
as a consequence of job
insecurity can be carried only so
far. At some point, the tradeoff
of subdued wage growth for job security
has to come to an end. In
other words, the relatively modest
wage gains we have experienced
are a temporary rather than a lasting
phenomenon because there is a
limit to the value of additional job
security people are willing to
acquire in exchange for lesser increases
in living standards. Even
if real wages were to remain permanently
on a lower upward track
than otherwise as a result of the
greater sense of insecurity, the
rate of change of wages would revert
at some point to a normal
relationship with inflation. The unknown
is when this transition
period will end.
Indeed, some recent evidence suggests
that the labor markets bear
especially careful watching for signs
that the return to more normal
patterns may be in process. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics reports
that people were somewhat more willing
to quit their jobs to seek
other employment in January than previously.
The possibility that
this reflects greater confidence by
workers accords with a recent
further rise in the percent of households
responding to a Conference
Board survey who perceive that job
availability is plentiful. Of
course, the job market has continued
to be quite good recently;
employment in January registered robust
growth and initial claims
for unemployment insurance have been
at a relatively low level of
late. Wages rose faster in 1996 than
in 1995 by most measures,
perhaps also raising questions about
whether the transitional period
of unusually slow wage gains may be
drawing to a close.
To be sure, the pickup in wage gains
has not shown through to
underlying price inflation. Increases
in the core CPI, as well as in
several broader measures of prices,
have stayed subdued or even
edged off further in recent months.
As best we can judge, faster
productivity growth last year meant
that rising compensation gains
did not cause labor costs per unit
of output to increase any more
rapidly. Non-labor costs, which are
roughly a quarter of total
consolidated costs of the nonfinancial
corporate sector, were little
changed in 1996.
Owing in part to this subdued behavior
of unit costs, profits and
rates of return on capital have risen
to high levels. As a
consequence, businesses believe that,
were they to raise prices to
boost profits further, competitors
with already ample profit margins
would not follow suit; instead, they
would use the occasion to
capture a greater market share. This
interplay is doubtless a
significant factor in the evident
loss of pricing power in American
business.
Intensifying global competition also
may be further restraining
domestic firms' ability to hike prices
as well as wages. Clearly,
the appreciation of the dollar on
balance over the past eighteen
months or so, together with low inflation
in many of our trading
partners, has resulted in a marked
decline in non-oil import prices
that has helped to damp domestic inflation
pressures. Yet it is
important to emphasize that these
influences, too, would be holding
down inflation only temporarily; they
represent a transition to a
lower price level than would otherwise
prevail, not to a permanently
lower rate of inflation.
Against the background of all these
considerations, the FOMC has
recognized the need to remain vigilant
for signs of potentially
inflationary imbalances that might,
if not corrected promptly,
undermine our economic expansion.
The FOMC in fact has signaled a
state of heightened alert for possible
policy tightening since last
July in its policy directives. But,
we have also taken care not to
act prematurely. The FOMC refrained
from changing policy last
summer, despite expectations of a
near-term policy firming by many
financial market participants. In
light of the developments I've
just discussed affecting wages and
prices, we thought inflation
might well remain damped, and in any
case was unlikely to pick up
very rapidly, in part because the
economic expansion appeared likely
to slow to a more sustainable pace.
In the event, inflation has
remained quiescent since then.
Given the lags with which monetary
policy affects the economy,
however, we cannot rule out a situation
in which a preemptive policy
tightening may become appropriate
before any sign of actual higher
inflation becomes evident. If the
FOMC were to implement such an
action, it would be judging that the
risks to the economic expansion
of waiting longer had increased unduly
and had begun to outweigh the
advantages of waiting for uncertainties
to be reduced by the
accumulation of more information about
economic trends. Indeed, the
hallmark of a successful policy to
foster sustainable economic
growth is that inflation does not
rise. I find it ironic that our
actions in 1994-95 were criticized
by some because inflation did not
turn upward. That outcome, of course,
was the intent of the
tightening, and I am satisfied that
our actions then were both
necessary and effective, and helped
to foster the continued economic
expansion.
To be sure, 1997 is not 1994. The
real federal funds rate today is
significantly higher than it was three
years ago. Then we had just
completed an extended period of monetary
ease which addressed the
credit stringencies of the early 1990s,
and with the abatement of
the credit crunch, the low real funds
rate of early 1994 was clearly
incompatible with containing inflation
and sustaining growth going
forward. In February 1997, in contrast,
our concern is a matter of
relative risks rather than of expected
outcomes. The real funds
rate, judging by core inflation, is
only slightly below its early
1995 peak for this cycle and might
be at a level that will promote
continued non- inflationary growth,
especially considering the
recent rise in the exchange value
of the dollar. Nonetheless, we
cannot be sure. And the risks of being
wrong are clearly tilted to
the upside.
I wish it were possible to lay out
in advance exactly what
conditions have to prevail to portend
a buildup of inflation
pressures or inflationary psychology.
However, the circumstances
that have been associated with increasing
inflation in the past have
not followed a single pattern. The
processes have differed from
cycle to cycle, and what may have
been a useful leading indicator in
one instance has given off misleading
signals in another.
I have already discussed the key role
of labor market developments
in restraining inflation in the current
cycle and our careful
monitoring of signs that the transition
phase of trading off lower
real wages for greater job security
might be coming to a close. As
always, with resource utilization
rates high, we would need to watch
closely a situation in which demand
was clearly unsustainable
because it was producing escalating
pressures on resources, which
could destabilize the economy. And
we would need to be watchful that
the progress we have made in keeping
inflation expectations damped
was not eroding. In general, though,
our analysis will need to
encompass all potentially relevant
information, from financial
markets as well as the economy, especially
when some signals, like
those in the labor market, have not
been following their established
patterns.
The ongoing economic expansion to
date has reinforced our conviction
about the importance of low inflation--and
the public's confidence
in continued low inflation. The economic
expansion almost surely
would not have lasted nearly so long
had monetary policy supported
an unsustainable acceleration of spending
that induced a buildup of
inflationary imbalances. The Federal
Reserve must not acquiesce in
an upcreep in inflation, for acceding
to higher inflation would
countenance an insidious weakening
of our chances for sustaining
long-run economic growth. Inflation
interferes with the efficient
allocation of resources by confusing
price signals, undercutting a
focus on the longer run, and distorting
incentives.
This year overall inflation is anticipated
to stay restrained. The
central tendency of the forecasts
made by the Board members and
Reserve Bank presidents has the increase
in the total CPI slipping
back into a range of 2-3/4 to 3 percent
over the four quarters of
the year. This slight falloff from
last year's pace is expected to
owe in part to a slower rise in food
prices as some of last year's
supply limitations ease. More importantly,
world oil supplies are
projected by most analysts to increase
relative to world oil demand,
and futures markets project a further
decline in prices, at least in
the near term. The recent and prospective
declines in crude oil
prices not only should affect retail
gasoline and home heating oil
prices but also should relieve inflation
pressures through lower
prices for other petroleum products,
which are imbedded in the
economy's underlying cost structure.
Nonetheless, the trend in
inflation rates in the core CPI and
in broader price measures may be
somewhat less favorable than in recent
years. A continued tight
labor market, whose influence on costs
would be augmented by the
scheduled increase in the minimum
wage later in the year and perhaps
by higher growth of benefits now that
considerable health-care
savings already have been realized,
could put upward pressure on
core inflation. Moreover, the effects
of the sharp rise in the
dollar over the last eighteen months
in pushing down import prices
are likely to ebb over coming quarters.
The unemployment rate, according to
Board members and Bank
presidents, should stay around 5-1/4
to 5-1/2 percent through the
fourth quarter, consistent with their
projections of measured real
GDP growth of 2 to 2-1/4 percent over
the four quarters of the year.
Such a growth rate would represent
some downshifting in output
expansion from that of last year.
The projected moderation of growth
likely would reflect several influences:
(1) declines in real
federal government purchases should
be exerting a modest degree of
restraint on overall demand; (2) the
lagged effects of the increase
in the exchange value of the dollar
in recent months likely will
damp U.S. net exports somewhat this
year; and (3) residential
construction is unlikely to repeat
the gains of 1996. On the other
hand, we do not see evidence of widespread
imbalances either in
business inventories or in stocks
of equipment and consumer durables
that would lead to a substantial cutback
in spending. And financial
conditions overall remain supportive;
real interest rates are not
high by historical standards and credit
is readily available from
intermediaries and in the market.
The usual uncertainties in the overall
outlook are especially
focused on the behavior of consumers.
Consumption should rise
roughly in line with the projected
moderate expansion of disposable
income, but both upside and downside
risks are present. According to
various surveys, sentiment is decidedly
upbeat. Consumers have
enjoyed healthy gains in their real
incomes along with the
extraordinary stock-market driven
rise in their financial wealth
over the last couple of years. Indeed,
econometric models suggest
that the more than $4 trillion rise
in equity values since late 1994
should have had a larger positive
influence on consumer spending
than seems to have actually occurred.
It is possible, however, that households
have been reluctant to
spend much of their added wealth because
they see a greater need to
keep it to support spending in retirement.
Many households have
expressed heightened concern about
their financial security in old
age, which reportedly has led to increased
provision for retirement.
The results of a survey conducted
annually by the Roper
Organization, which asks individuals
about their confidence in the
Social Security system, shows that
between 1992 and 1996 the percent
of respondents expressing little or
no confidence in the system
jumped from about 45 percent to more
than 60 percent.
Moreover, consumer debt burdens are
near historical highs, while
credit card delinquencies and personal
bankruptcies have risen
sharply over the past year. These
circumstances may make both
borrowers and lenders a bit more cautious,
damping spending. In
fact, we may be seeing both wealth
and debt effects already at work
for different segments of the population,
to an approximately
offsetting extent. Saving out of current
income by households in the
upper income quintile, who own nearly
three-fourths of all
non-pension equities held by households,
evidently has declined in
recent years. At the same time, the
use of credit for purchases
appears to have leveled off after
a sharp runup from 1993 to 1996,
perhaps because some households are
becoming debt constrained and,
as a result, are curtailing their
spending.
The Federal Reserve will be weighing
these influences as it
endeavors to help extend the current
period of sustained growth.
Participants in financial markets
seem to believe that in the
current benign environment the FOMC
will succeed indefinitely. There
is no evidence, however, that the
business cycle has been repealed.
Another recession will doubtless occur
some day owing to
circumstances that could not be, or
at least were not, perceived by
policymakers and financial market
participants alike. History
demonstrates that participants in
financial markets are susceptible
to waves of optimism, which can in
turn foster a general process of
asset-price inflation that can feed
through into markets for goods
and services. Excessive optimism sows
the seeds of its own reversal
in the form of imbalances that tend
to grow over time. When
unwarranted expectations ultimately
are not realized, the unwinding
of these financial excesses can act
to amplify a downturn in
economic activity, much as they can
amplify the upswing. As you
know, last December I put the question
this way: "...how do we know
when irrational exuberance has unduly
escalated asset values, which
then become subject to unexpected
and prolonged contractions ...?"
We have not been able, as yet, to
provide a satisfying answer to
this question, but there are reasons
in the current environment to
keep this question on the table. Clearly,
when people are exposed to
long periods of relative economic
tranquility, they seem inevitably
prone to complacency about the future.
This is understandable. We
have had fifteen years of economic
expansion interrupted by only one
recession--and that was six years
ago. As the memory of such past
events fades, it naturally seems ever
less sensible to keep up one's
guard against an adverse event in
the future. Thus, it should come
as no surprise that, after such a
long period of balanced expansion,
risk premiums for advancing funds
to businesses in virtually all
financial markets have declined to
near- record lows.
Is it possible that there is something
fundamentally new about this
current period that would warrant
such complacency? Yes, it is
possible. Markets may have become
more efficient, competition is
more global, and information technology
has doubtless enhanced the
stability of business operations.
But, regrettably, history is
strewn with visions of such "new
eras" that, in the end, have proven
to be a mirage. In short, history
counsels caution.
Such caution seems especially warranted
with regard to the sharp
rise in equity prices during the past
two years. These gains have
obviously raised questions of sustainability.
Analytically, current
stock-price valuations at prevailing
long-term interest rates could
be justified by very strong earnings
growth expectations. In fact,
the long-term earnings projections
of financial analysts have been
marked up noticeably over the last
year and seem to imply very high
earnings growth and continued rising
profit margins, at a time when
such margins are already up appreciably
from their depressed levels
of five years ago. It could be argued
that, although margins are the
highest in a generation, they are
still below those that prevailed
in the 1960s. Nonetheless, further
increases in these margins would
evidently require continued restraint
on costs: labor compensation
continuing to grow at its current
pace and productivity growth
picking up. Neither, of course, can
be ruled out. But we should keep
in mind that, at these relatively
low long-term interest rates,
small changes in long-term earnings
expectations could have outsized
impacts on equity prices.
Caution also seems warranted by the
narrow yield spreads that
suggest perceptions of low risk, possibly
unrealistically low risk.
Considerable optimism about the ability
of businesses to sustain
this current healthy financial condition
seems, as I indicated
earlier, to be influencing the setting
of risk premiums, not just in
the stock market but throughout the
financial system. This
optimistic attitude has become especially
evident in quality spreads
on high- yield corporate bonds--what
we used to call "junk bonds."
In addition, banks have continued
to ease terms and standards on
business loans, and margins on many
of these loans are now quite
thin. Many banks are pulling back
a little from consumer credit card
lending as losses exceed expectations.
Nonetheless, some bank and
nonbank lenders have been expanding
aggressively into the home
equity loan market and so-called "subprime"
auto lending, although
recent problems in the latter may
already be introducing a sense of
caution.
Why should the central bank be concerned
about the possibility that
financial markets may be overestimating
returns or mispricing risk?
It is not that we have a firm view
that equity prices are
necessarily excessive right now or
risk spreads patently too low.
Our goal is to contribute as best
we can to the highest possible
growth of income and wealth over time,
and we would be pleased if
the favorable economic environment
projected in markets actually
comes to pass. Rather, the FOMC has
to be sensitive to indications
of even slowly building imbalances,
whatever their source, that, by
fostering the emergence of inflation
pressures, would ultimately
threaten healthy economic expansion.
Unfortunately, because the monetary
aggregates were subject to an
episode of aberrant behavioral patterns
in the early 1990s, they are
likely to be of only limited help
in making this judgment. For three
decades starting in the early 1960s,
the public's demand for the
broader monetary aggregates, especially
M2, was reasonably
predictable. In the intermediate term,
M2 velocity--nominal income
divided by the stock of M2--tended
to vary directly with the
difference between money market yields
and the return on M2
assets--that is, with its short-term
opportunity cost. In the long
run, as adjustments in deposit rates
caused the opportunity cost to
revert to an equilibrium, M2 velocity
also tended to return to an
associated stable equilibrium level.
For several years in the early
1990s, however, the velocities of
M2 and M3 exhibited persisting
upward shifts that departed markedly
from these historical patterns.
In the last two to three years, velocity
patterns seem to have
returned to those historical relationships,
after allowing for a
presumed permanent upward shift in
the levels of velocity. Even so,
given the abnormal velocity behavior
during the early 1990s, FOMC
members continue to see considerable
uncertainty in the relationship
of broad money to opportunity costs
and nominal income. Concern
about the possibility of aberrant
behavior has made the FOMC
hesitant to upgrade the role of these
measures in monetary policy.
Against this background, at its February
meeting, the FOMC
reaffirmed the provisional ranges
set last July for money and debt
growth this year: 1 to 5 percent for
M2, 2 to 6 percent for M3, and
3 to 7 percent for the debt of domestic
nonfinancial sectors. The M2
and M3 ranges again are designed to
be consistent with the FOMC's
long-run goal of price stability:
For, if the velocities of the
broader monetary aggregates were to
continue behaving as they did
before 1990, then money growth around
the middle portions of the
ranges would be consistent with noninflationary,
sustainable
economic expansion. But, even with
such velocity behavior this year,
when inflation is expected to still
be higher than is consistent
with our long-run objective of reasonable
price stability, the
broader aggregates could well grow
around the upper bounds of these
ranges. The debt aggregate probably
will expand around the middle of
its range this year.
I will conclude on the same upbeat
note about the U.S. economy with
which I began. Although a central
banker's occupational
responsibility is to stay on the lookout
for trouble, even I must
admit that our economic prospects
in general are quite favorable.
The flexibility of our market system
and the vibrancy of our private
sector remain examples for the whole
world to emulate. The Federal
Reserve will endeavor to do its part
by continuing to foster a
monetary framework under which our
citizens can prosper to the
fullest possible extent.
《 dollar declines
.............not by intervention 》
ドルは今週、２月８日のG7以来初めて目に見える形で大きく下落しました。特に木曜日のニューヨーク市場に入ってからの下げはきつかった。ドイツの今年１月のIFO景況指数（製造業、建設、卸売り部門対象）が、１２月の９０．０（当初発表は９１．０）から、９３．３に大幅に上昇（エコノミストの予想平均は９１．１だった）したとの報道などが「ドル安の材料」とされているものの、これとは別に
- ドイツ当局者の「一層のドル高」に対する警告などが続く中で、一段のドル高に対する介入警戒感が引き続き強いこと
- 米貿易収支赤字の拡大傾向、アメリカの景気の先行きに対するさめた見方の台頭など、アメリカ経済および当局のドル高許容度に関する疑念の台頭
- アメリカの資産市場が、株がダウで７０００ドルに乗せた後、足踏み状態を続けていることでドルを買い持ちにすることへの安心感に対する疑念
などが市場ではみられ、これらが重なってドルの大幅な下げを誘発したものと思われる。最初の当局の介入に対する懸念は、G7合意が「妥協の産物」「玉虫色の合意」「フランスは反対していた」など様々な疑念や評価が入り乱れる中でも、徐々に高まっていたもの。中央銀行の中で一番介入政策に消極的で、実体経済面でも「介入の必要性」が一番低いと見られているドイツ連銀の当局者は、今週だけでティートマイヤー・ドイツ連銀総裁初め数人が何回にも渡って「より一段の持続的なドル高」に対する反対の意向を表明した。このことが、市場のドル強気論を弱めたと言える。
また、今週の為替関連の記事の中には、週央のウォール・ストリート・ジャーナルの「最後に笑うのは、中央銀行かもしれない」といった記事のように、市場の疑念にもかかわらず介入の可能性を強く示唆する見方もあった。また、市場では「G7では介入のレベルまで決まっていた」といったような未確認情報も流れていた。１２５円を手前で何回もずり落ちるドルに対して、いったん売りが出てもおかしくはない時期だったとも言える。そういう意味では、G7後の為替相場は対マルクではやや上昇しているものの、いままでのところは当局の「取り組み勝ち」となっている。
《 but with
fear and its own gravity 》
しかし、介入懸念だけではなく、ドルはそれ自身が最近にない「重力」を感じ始めていたことも確かである。G7直後の「にもかかわらずドルは上昇する」との一般的な見通しがアメリカ経済のファンダメンタルズに支えられていれば、ドルは多少の介入懸念にも関わらず、上昇していてもおかしくなかった。
その「重力」とは、一つはアメリカの資産市場、特に株式市場に対する高値警戒感。ダウで７０００ドルに乗った直後は、「まだ行く」との見方が強かったものの、やはりその後は警戒感との綱引きで、さらに買い上げるという雰囲気ではない。木曜日のニューヨークの株式市場は、そうしたもたれ感もあり、ダウ平均は
92.75ドル下げて6927.38ドルと、７０００ドルを割った。The
Standard & Poor's 500種指数は、9.72ドル安の802.77ドル、
New York Stock Exchange Composite Indexは、4.48ドル安の421.09ドル。
今週は株に関する記事がいっぱいアメリカのマスコミにもあって、７０００ドルに乗った直後の記事は、どちらかというとその持続性や、上昇のスピードに対する懸念を表明するものが多かった。ある記事は、
「ウォール・ストリートはますます１９８０年代の東京に似てきた。東京の株はピーク時に、日本のGDPの１４０％まで上がったが、今のニューヨークは同じ基準で１３３％になっている」（ニューヨーク・タイムズ）
とまで書いていた。当時の日本と今のアメリカを単純に比べるのはむろん問題があります。当時（１９８０年代の後半）私は、日本経済を「圧力鍋経済」と呼んでいた。円高で資金は外に出ていかない。国内は超低金利。規制の緩和も進んでいない。まあ、いってみれば閉ざされた国での資産価格の大幅な上昇。ですから、土地から株からゴルフ会員権からすべて上がった。
しかし、今のアメリカは十分に市場を開放した上での株価上昇です。確かに速い。しかし、ニューヨークに上場されている株が、「アメリカ株」だと思うのも間違っていると思います。あれは、実質的に「多国籍企業」の株の集合体です。ですから、アメリカ経済の命運とだけ結びつけるのには無理がある。市場を引っ張っているのは、世界中の消費者を相手としているハイテク企業です。しかし、株価の上昇ペースそのものには、懸念が残っている。今日あたりに講演を予定しているグリーンスパンFED議長の発言などが注目される。
為替に話を戻すと、むろん今朝のウォール・ストリート・ジャーナルの為替市況記事のように、「ドルはすぐ底を見つけて、反発するものと予想されている」という見方も強い。しかし、米１２月の月間、それに昨年一年間の貿易収支の大幅赤字や、物価指数が出る度にその可能性が後退する利上げ観測などが、ドルの頭を重くしている。それに、介入懸念。
日本サイドから見ると、４−６月について予約がほぼゼロとなっている輸出業者の動きが新たなポイントでしょう。ドル高見通しが強かっただけに、輸出業者の予約率は低い。また、日本株が上昇し、債券利回りが一時的にも上昇する中で、資本の流れにも気をつけたい。
《 many many
fire drills 》
ｹ小平氏死去は、「もう避難訓練を何十回となくやった」（当社香港支店）ということもあって、市場では大きな材料にされていない。香港の株も昨日は堅調推移。これまで比較的高かった香港ドルの短期金利も、むしろ不安感一掃から低下した。
今朝の日経の春秋に書いてありますが、ｹ小平さんは、香港の中国返還を一目見たかったのではないでしょうか。台湾問題以上に、中国にとっては香港は「誇れない歴史」を引きずったものでしたから。でも、９２歳のご高齢でしたから、病名（パーキンソン氏病）はついていても天寿を全うされたというのが当たっていると思います。
――――――――――
「避難訓練」という観点では、日本で何回も取りざたされる金融不安とそれへの対処が実際に起きたときに、為替、株、債券に何が起きるかを十分に考えておく必要があるでしょう。昨日の「総合土地対策」の報で、株価は大きく上げましたが、危機が顕在化してくればくるほど、それに対する民間、政府の対策が出てくる。たとえば、住専の時におおもめに揉めた公的資金が、今度は危機対策で実際に投入されることが決まった時に、為替、株、債券に何が起きるかです。
昨日の株の動きは、まあ言ってみればそれに近い動きと言えるかもしれない。むろん、実際にどのような対策が出るかが一番重要で、それは今から正確には予測できないのですが、シミュレーションをしておく必要はある。マーケットは常に「先取り」が原則ですから、一番危機的に見えるときに、「次の動き」を織り込もうとする。
《 have a nice
weekend 》
寒い日と暖かい日が交互にくる感じがしますね。でも、日差しは着実に強くなっている。風邪はまだ猛威をふるっているようです。お気をつけて。
今週は、月曜日に名古屋にお伺いしました。風が強かったですね。大勢の方にいらっしていただいて、質問も多かったのが皆さんのご興味が深かったことを示しています。私のe-mail番号を出席者に残しておきましたら、３人のお客様からあとでメールをいただきました。こういう形が今後も増えていくんでしょうね。この日は、ちょうど名古屋の法人営業部長に赴任した服部君が、朝４時起きで東京から名古屋に赴任した日で、彼は眠そうでしたな。ゴルフは全方位powerful
hitter、麻雀は誰かのリーチに挑むときは、まずそいつの顔を睨んでからパイを曲げるという癖を持つ。パワフルな男です。名古屋とその周辺の皆様には、よろしく。
――――――――――
今週多少賢くなったと思うのは、マイクロソフトのプレゼンテーション・ソフトである「Power
point」を覚えたことでしょうか。このソフトは、今までも講演の時に使ったことはありますが、市場金融部の町田君や森山君に作ってもらっていた。しかし、情けない。自分のプレゼンテーションなのに。そこで、一念発起。でも、始めたら早かった。「筆まめ君」マスター程度のソフトですな、あれは。むろん使いこなすには、まだいろいろな隠し技があるのでしょうが。使うメリットは、「便利・綺麗」ということでしょうか。ワープロ程度の知識で２〜３時間でマスターできます。
まだ寒い。週末はゆっくりとお休みください。
<ycaster@gol.com>